Good Faith, Banks and Cautionary Obligations under Scots Law

by Legal Author on November 16, 2010

Good Faith, Banks and Cautionary Obligations under Scots Law

This is an essay I wrote in my 3rd year of law school in 2005-2006 at Glasgow University for the Commercial Banking Honours class.

If you have any essays or dissertations that have not yet been published, please register with a YoublawG account for free and post it here to give it some web presence. As per the Legal section of this website, the copyright in anything you post belongs to you.

Best wishes
Gavin Ward

Introduction

It is well settled in Scots law that a Bank owes a duty of care to its customer. However, the concept of a Bank owing a duty of care to another party is not, and is indeed contradictory to Scots law principles. A result of relatively recent judicial development , or perhaps more apt, judicial innovation , this duty of care to third parties with regard to guarantees and undue influence or misrepresentation has become “dramatically” entrenched in Scots law.

As such, Smith v Bank of Scotland which consciously and effectively assembled English law, contained in Barclay’s Bank v O’Brien , into Scots law has occasioned much academic debate , stemming from two main criticisms. First, the new rule is “unprincipled” and should not have been introduced into Scots law, particularly because it is difficult to see how there should be a duty of care to a party with whom the Bank has no relationship.
Second, the House of Lords was acting like a supreme court and, as such, the “innovatory” decision was nothing other than a “complete change to the law of Scotland achieved by judicial pronouncement rather than legislation.”

The Jack Committee noted problems with the unfavourable position of guarantors several years before these developments . However, effectively overlooking a topic which would cause much controversy in the future, it felt in “no position to make recommendations that bear on the law of guarantees.” Indeed it was justified in doing so as the problem was not on the horizon in 1989, which shows the dynamism and change inherent in the subject of banking law.

Bundy

The forerunner to Barclay’s Bank v O’Brien , Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy established in England protection for a third party in respect of a guarantee drawn over the debts of a debtor.

In this case, Mr Bundy granted a guarantee in respect of “all sums” due by him and his son, supported by a mortgage over his house and farm. Upon excessive accrual of the son’s debts and subsequent default, the Bank tried to evict Mr Bundy.

However, reaching an equitable decision which granted relief from eviction, the Court set out four reasons why the third party, Mr Bundy, should be protected. First, he was old; second, he was naïve in business matters; third, his farm was his only asset; and fourth, a fiduciary relationship existed between Mr Bundy and the Bank. Lord Denning MR reasoned that underpinning these categories was a single principle of “inequality of bargaining power”.

“Open to serious criticism” , particularly in light of promotion of policy, these duties of care did not feature and indeed did not work in Scots law. Thus, if Bundy makes no sense in Scots law, neither should the case law which follows it.

O’Brien

A “much celebrated case” , Barclay’s Bank v O’Brien further clarified the English position.

In O’Brien, the Bank granted additional funds to Mr O’Brien for the purposes of his business with security over the matrimonial home owned by both him and Mrs O’Brien. Making representations, Mr O’Brien asked his wife to sign a mortgage, which, he claimed, had a limit of £60,000 for a duration of 3 weeks. Having received no advice from the Bank regarding the terms of the mortgage nor any suggestion to seek independent legal advice, Mrs O’Brien signed the mortgage, which was actually for £140,000 for an unlimited duration.

The House of Lords held that Mrs O’Brien was permitted to set aside the Bank’s charge due to the Bank’s “constructive notice” of Mr O’Brien’s wrongful undue influence or misrepresentations. Four important principles can be identified in a summary of Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment.

First, a guarantor has a right against the principal debtor to set aside the guarantee where it has been procured by undue influence or misrepresentation.

It is fundamental to note that, prima facie, there was no guarantee agreement. However, since Mrs O’Brien stood as surety for all sums due by Mr O’Brien, she stood as if she was a guarantor and thus the mortgage stood effectively as if it was a guarantee agreement. This has considerable importance since such a guarantee will be strictly construed against the interests of the guarantor. Furthermore, it is important to note that this position was reflected in Smith where there was a mortgage which was effectively like a guarantee agreement and Mrs Smith was as if she was a guarantor.

As a guarantor, Mrs O’Brien had a right against the principal debtor, Mr O’Brien to set aside this guarantee, yet such a right is ineffective against the creditor, Barclays Bank Plc.

Second, a guarantor will also have the right to set aside the guarantee against the creditor who has actual or constructive notice of such undue influence or misrepresentation.
Actual notice did not exist as the Bank was at no stage prior to the wife’s subscription informed about Mr O’Brien’s undue influence or misrepresentations. Therefore the doctrine of “constructive notice” bears great significance.

Third, a creditor will be fixed with constructive notice of the guarantor’s rights if the circumstances are such as to put the creditor on inquiry as to the circumstances in which the guarantor had agreed to give the security. A creditor will be put on inquiry when, for example, a wife offers to stand guarantor for her husband’s debts where the transaction is on its facts not to the financial advantage of the wife.

Fourth, to avoid such constructive notice, a creditor should take reasonable steps to satisfy himself that the guarantor’s agreement to stand guarantor has been obtained properly.
Therefore, Barclays Bank Plc had constructive notice of the undue influence or misrepresentations since it was put on inquiry due to the lack of financial interest of Mrs O’Brien in the transaction. In not warning or advising Mrs O’Brien as to the legal consequences of her subscription to the mortgage, she was able to set aside the guarantee against the Bank.

Mumford

Although this doctrine of constructive notice was merely “unconventional” in English law, it did not apply in Scots law outwith the context of agency. Thus in Mumford v Bank of Scotland , whose facts are essentially similar to those in O’Brien, Lord Johnston’s judgment was entirely diametrically opposed to that in O’Brien. Producing a judgment which cannot be faulted in terms of principles of Scots law, Lord Johnston reasoned that nothing in the circumstances could infer constructive notice and, furthermore, that the Bank had no obligation in the absence of actual knowledge of the relevant facts, therefore it had no obligation to advise the wife as to the nature of the documentation, nor to require her to seek legal advice.

Smith

On appeal to the House of Lords, in Mumford’s sister case, Smith v Bank of Scotland , Lord Johnston’s decision was overturned with a “striking” approach. Delivering the leading judgment, Lord Clyde dismissed the principle of constructive notice, but instead relied on the “basic element of good faith” , such that it seemed

“reasonable to accept that there should also be a duty in particular circumstances to give the potential cautioner certain advice. Thus in circumstances where the creditor should reasonably suspect that there may be factors bearing on the participation of the cautioner which might undermine the validity of the contract through his or her intimate relationship with the debtor the duty would arise and would have to be fulfilled if the creditor is not to be prevented from later enforcing the contract.”

Thus the duty of the Bank was to remain in good faith through taking active steps. Sufficient steps would have been to “warn the potential cautioner of the consequences of entering into the proposed cautionary obligation and to [have] advise[d] him or her to take independent advice”.

Academic Criticism

Academic opinion suggests that this decision “simply represented a need to assimilate the laws of Scotland and England”. Indeed the main question which Lord Clyde asked was whether a “corresponding extension” to the “consciously sought” O’Brien decision should be made in Scotland. Smith achieved this need by extending the principle set out in Barclay’s Bank Plc v O’Brien, but did so on the “remarkable ground that there were no grounds for refusing such an extension.” Thus the decision was “grounded on policy rather than on principles of law”. Such policy comprises not only the need for assimilation itself, but also the “important” need to protect the matrimonial home, those subject to influences within relationships and weaker parties generally.
The fundamental concern is therefore whether this policy decision can be justified without contradicting recognised principles of Scots law. Indeed, Lord Goff of Chieveley explained that a policy approach, which generates judicial law reform, provides a “great advantage”, provided that such “practical justice” is “done within a framework of principle.”

Why “Good Faith” is Bad

Lord Clyde explained the basic principle that a “voluntary obligation is not rendered open to challenge simply on the ground that it has been entered into as the result of a misrepresentation made by a third party.” He noted several exceptions to this general rule . However, clearly none apply to Mrs Smith, therefore had her case been decided on principle, it would have been unsuccessful. Indeed Lord Jauncey stated that “applying the principles of Scots law alone, I would therefore have been disposed to dismiss this appeal.” Furthermore, in applying the principle of good faith, Lord Clyde confusingly extended his discussion, referring to the “broad principle in the field of contract law of fair dealing in good faith.” However, it is doubtful whether this can provide authority, particularly as it concerned the sale of land.

Why “Good Faith” is Good

Notwithstanding, there are several counter claims to this argument to the effect that the application of this principle of good faith is justified.

First, Smith simply applied an old solution, the “convenient peg” of good faith in contract law, to deal with a new fact situation. Second, there had been much recent judicial creativity in the House of Lords. Third, doctrines and principles, like that of good faith, are inevitably “battered and bruised” in advancing the law. Fourth, the judgment in Smith was a “simple call of justice.” Last, the decision effectively provided judicial backing to the position which already existed in the Banking Code, which, if it had been followed, would not have put the Bank in such a predicament.

Policy Against Principle

“No one who has studied the case law of the House of Lords during recent years can have detected much evidence of self restraint. The House of Lords has become active in law reform.”

A minority of academic commentators therefore take the view that the Smith decision was a “welcome and sensible development”, primarily arguing that the laws of Scotland and England should be no different to each other. One particular reason, unsurprisingly advocated by international banking lawyers, is that, as Lord Clyde felt was compelling , there are practical advantages in ensuring that the two systems develop in tandem, producing reduced inconvenience, duplication and cost. Indeed these are “undoubted” advantages , but they do not wholly justify the assimilation of the laws, and indeed the erosion of existing Scots law principles, through judicial creativity.

Thus, there is a majority of commentators who feel that such a decision is “better achieved through consultation and consideration by the Law Commission followed by legislative change rather than by the judicial activism exemplified by Smith.” It has been claimed that the price of uniformity is a “spate” of Scottish wives claiming reduction of their mortgages , but this is certainly not the only price: arguments in favour of assimilation do not retract from the fact that Smith was unprincipled and certainly does not maintain the “distinctiveness of Scots law in this field” .

Post-Smith Case Law

Post-Smith banking became very “unsteady, requiring banks and lenders alike to remain very diligent in accepting inter-spousal guarantees,” partly because Smith did little to clarify the scope of the duty of good faith. Indeed, Lord Clyde considered it unnecessary to identify the relationships which could lead to a duty on the creditor to make enquiries. Another reason is that the exact ratio decidendi is difficult to extract from Smith. Therefore an examination of post-Smith case law is vital.

Wright

The types of personal relationship to which a duty of care can arise has been somewhat clarified. In Wright v Cotias Investment Corporation , the court noted that a mother-son relationship is certainly one such relationship, despite ruling that a company, not the son, was the principal debtor.

Braithwaite

Smith was first considered in Braithwaite v The Bank of Scotland and was interpreted very restrictively. Failure of the Bank to advise was not in itself a ground for reducing the security; a proven actionable wrong must exist before the party can rely on the doctrine of good faith. In its judgment, the Court placed considerable emphasis on O’Brien, reasoning that Scots law principles should be applied in the same way as those in England.

Watt and Etridge

Reliance on English decisions was again prevalent in Watt v Royal Bank of Scotland , which effectively applied Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) . In Etridge, the Court held that once the Bank had advised the prospective guarantor as to the nature and extent of the security and had urged him to take independent legal advice, its duty of care would be fulfilled and would shift to the solicitor, provided it had supplied the solicitor with sufficient financial information about the debtor and that it was satisfied that the solicitor had properly advised the guarantor.

Despite one factual difference, in that the solicitor acted on behalf of both the husband and the Bank, the Outer House in Watt held that the Bank could rely on the solicitor advising the cautioner, thereby having no duty of good faith. Although cemented by Broadway v Clydesdale Bank , further developments have not favoured the releasing of Banks from their duty of good faith.

Black

The Extra Division in Clydesdale Bank v Black made two remarkable judgments. First, Smith represented new law , therefore since the security pre-dated Smith, the Bank had complied with the good faith requirements as understood in Scots law at that time. Second, as such, the specific requirements of Etridge did not touch on Scots law.

Wilson and Laura Thomson

In Royal Bank of Scotland v Wilson , the Lord Justice Clerk Gill was also of the view that Etridge had no effect on the law of Scotland. Furthermore, Wilson ruled that the duty of good faith in Smith does not apply to “all sums” securities since the wife had an interest, even if merely indirect, in the business of the husband and, as such, the security was cautionary on both the wife and husband. Interestingly, the security in Smith was also “all sums”, but the Lord Justice Clerk nevertheless held this point to be decisive in Wilson since it was not argued in Smith. After extension consideration of both Black and Wilson, the Court in Laura Thomson v Royal Bank of Scotland also shared these views.

These judgments effectively took Scots law to pre-Smith and thus appear to have eliminated the likelihood of success for guarantors in such cases. However, it is worth noting that if Wilson or Laura Thomson were appealed to the House of Lords, they may have been overturned, especially in light of the policy, and supposed “proper” principle, considerations of Smith.

Conclusion

Lord Clarke had no “lingering doubts that the law of England and the law of Scotland have converged in this area,” particularly as a result of Wilson’s clear and robust formulations of the law. Indeed, this belief is widespread throughout academic commentary. Assimilating these laws on a questionable “need” for convergence, Smith effectively followed O’Brien, albeit “battering and bruising” the malleable and “proper” Scottish principle of good faith in contract, rather than imposing the doctrine of constructive notice, which, rightfully, had and, indeed, has no place in Scots law outwith the scope of agency. As such, a significant new remedy was provided for wives or certain others , as third party guarantors, wishing to reduce securities over their homes. However, this relatively new position has been somewhat weakened, owing to recent Scottish case law, namely Black, Wilson and Laura Thomson, which is itself questionable and open to serious criticism, particularly in light of the House of Lords’s recent judicial activism.

Endnotes

Langtry v Union Bank of London [1896] 1 LDAB 229; Verity and Spindler v Lloyd’s Bank Plc [1995] CLC 1557
Barclay’s Bank v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180; Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL)
Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45 at p40
Harper Macleod Solicitors, Recent Developments in Banking Law Including Ongoing Issues Re Mumford & Smith v The Bank of Scotland, Harper Macleod Solicitors Banking Bulletin
1997 S.L.T. 1061
Barclay’s Bank v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180
Rennie, R & Cusine, D.J., Standard Securities, 2nd ed., LexisNexis UK, 2002, p10; Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45; MacGregor, L., The House of Lords “Applies” O’Brien North of the Border, E.L.R. Vol. 2, pp. 90-93; Gretton, G., Sexually Transmitted Debt, S.L.T. 1997, 25, 195-197; Higgins, M., A Break from the Old Routine: The Doctrine in Smith, SLT 2002, 21, 173-175
Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45
Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45 at p40
Rennie, R & Cusine, D.J., Standard Securities, 2nd ed., LexisNexis UK, 2002, p10
Emanating from concerns of two consultees, the National Consumer Council and the Consumers Association, which noted that “there are cases of guarantors losing their houses because of open ended commitments that they entered into, without understanding or advice.” Report on Banking Services: Law and Practice 1989 (“The Jack Report”), Cm. 622 [HMSO, 1989], para. 13.22
Report on Banking Services: Law and Practice 1989 (“The Jack Report”), Cm. 622 [HMSO, 1989], para. 13.22
[1994] 1 AC 180
[1975] QB 326, CA
[1975] QB 326 at 339, per Lord Denning MR
Crerar, L.D., The Law of Banking in Scotland, Butterworths, 1997, p121;
Ibid.
[1994] 1 AC 180
Barclay’s Bank v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 at 198-199; Crerar, L.D., The Law of Banking in Scotland, Butterworths, 1997, pp.121-122
Crerar, L.D., The Law of Banking in Scotland, Butterworths, 1997, pp.121
which is the English equivalent, for our purposes, of a cautioner in Scotland.
Crerar, L.D., The Law of Banking in Scotland, Butterworths, 1997, pp.121
Ibid., at p122
Ibid.
Hapgood, M., Paget’s Law of Banking, 12th ed., Butterworths, 2002, para 28.9, but nevertheless the novelties in O’Brien did not lead the law astray, para 28.34-28.43
Mumford v Bank of Scotland 1996 SLT 392 at 394; Lord Johnston was “unable to find anything in the law of Scotland, outwith the context of agency” to support the application of constructive notice in those circumstances.
1996 SLT 392, (1st Div)
1997 SC 111 (HL)
Gretton, G., Sexually Transmitted Debt, S.L.T. 1997, 25, 195-197 at 195
Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL), at 118, per Lord Clyde
Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL), at 121, per Lord Clyde
Ibid., at 122, per Lord Clyde; It is interesting to note that despite not recommending or even foreseeing change in this area, the Jack Committee did “not see why Banks should not be more forthcoming about the legal effects and possible consequences of guarantees…and about the importance of receiving independent advice,”- The Jack Report at para 13.22; something which is now a crucial consideration for the banker following these developments.
Harper Macleod Solicitors, Security Advice, Harper Macleod Solicitors Banking Bulletin 1
Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL), at 118, per Lord Clyde
Rennie, R & Cusine, D.J., Standard Securities, 2nd ed., LexisNexis UK, 2002, p10; “I have not been persuaded that there have been sufficiently cogent grounds for refusing the extension.” Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL), at 120, per Lord Clyde
Harper Macleod Solicitors, Recent Developments in Banking Law Including Ongoing Issues Re Mumford & Smith v The Bank of Scotland, Harper Macleod Solicitors Banking Bulletin
Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45 at p41
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, at p682C-D
Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL), at 116, per Lord Clyde
Ibid., at 116-117 per Lord Clyde
MacGregor, L., The House of Lords “Applies” O’Brien North of the Border, E.L.R. Vol. 2, pp. 90-93, at p91
Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL), at 115, per Lord Jauncey
Ibid., at 121, per Lord Clyde; His main authority is Roger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483; Trade Development Bank v David W Haig (Bellshill) Ltd 1983 SLT 510 at 517
MacGregor, L., The House of Lords “Applies” O’Brien North of the Border, E.L.R. Vol. 2, pp. 90-93 at p92
Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45; David Johnston, “The Renewal of the Old” [1997] CLJ 80
Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45; English restitutionary lawyers in particular have become accustomed to this creativity, e.g. Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548, Woolich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] AC 70, White v Jones [1995] AC 207
Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45, Rodger, A.F., Thinking about Scots Law (The First WA Wilson Memorial Lecture), (1996) 1 ELR 3, at p9
Lord Goff of Chieveley’s words in Woolich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] AC 70 at p172C, Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45; good examples are Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66, White v Jones [1995] AC 207
Harper Macleod Solicitors, Banks, Wives and Security – Taking Stock of Developments Since Smith, Harper Macleod Solicitors Banking Bulletin 7; specific reference is made to the Clydesdale Bank Code of Practice, Point 14.
Gretton, G., Sexually Transmitted Debt, S.L.T. 1997, 25, 195-197
Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL), at 120, per Lord Clyde; also at p115 per Lord Jauncey
Pope, D., Scots Law Takes Actual Notice of Barclays Bank v O’Brien, JIBL 1997, 12(12), 493-494 at 494, particularly because of the likelihood of identical transactions between the same institutions on both sides of the border.
MacGregor, L., The House of Lords “Applies” O’Brien North of the Border, E.L.R. Vol. 2, pp. 90-93 at p93. Furthermore, it is interesting to note “scant attention” was given in Smith to these policy considerations – p91
Ibid., at p93
Pope, D., Scots Law Takes Actual Notice of Barclays Bank v O’Brien, JIBL 1997, 12(12), 493-494 at 494
As is the averment of Pope, D., Scots Law Takes Actual Notice of Barclays Bank v O’Brien, JIBL 1997, 12(12), 493-494 at 494
Harper Macleod Solicitors, Security Advice, Harper Macleod Solicitors Banking Bulletin 1
Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL), at 120, per Lord Clyde
Gretton, G., Sexually Transmitted Debt, S.L.T. 1997, 25, 195-197: Gretton finds it unclear and thus contemplates four variations on the Smith ratio.
2001 SLT 353
Wright v Cotias Investment Corporation 2001 SLT 353 at 360
1999 SLT 25
Watt v Royal Bank of Scotland 2000 SLT 129J
1999 All ER 715
2003 SLT 707
2002 S.C. 555, Ex Div, Court of Session
Clydesdale Bank v Black 2002 S.C. 555 at 561
Ibid., at 566F per Lord Coulsfield, 573H per Lord Marnoch
Ibid., at 569A and 570G per Lord Marnoch
2004 SC 153
Although Wilson divergently involved purchase/improvement of the house, the securities were essentially the same.
Ex Div, Court of Session, 28th October 2003, http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/ca62.html
Laura Thomson v Royal Bank of Scotland, Ex Div, Court of Session, 28th October 2003, http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/ca62.html, at para 50
Wright v Cotias Investment Corporation 2001 SLT 353

Bibliography

Cases

Langtry v Union Bank of London [1896] 1 LDAB 229
Verity and Spindler v Lloyd’s Bank Plc [1995] CLC 1557
Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326, CA
Barclay’s Bank v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180
Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL)
Mumford v Bank of Scotland 1996 SLT 392
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669
Roger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483
Trade Development Bank v David W Haig (Bellshill) Ltd 1983 SLT 510
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548
Woolich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] AC 70
White v Jones [1995] AC 207
Woolich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] AC 70
Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66
Wright v Cotias Investment Corporation 2001 SLT 353
Braithwaite v The Bank of Scotland 1999 SLT 25
Watt v Royal Bank of Scotland 2000 SLT 129J
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2). 1999 All ER 715
Broadway v Clydesdale Bank 2003 SLT 707
Clydesdale Bank v Black 2002 S.C. 555
Royal Bank of Scotland v Wilson 2004 SC 153
Laura Thomson v Royal Bank of Scotland, Ex Div, Court of Session, 28th October 2003, http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/ca62.html

Reports

Report on Banking Services: Law and Practice 1989 (“The Jack Report”), Cm. 622 [HMSO, 1989]

Codes of Practice

Clydesdale Bank Code of Practice

Textbooks

Rennie, R & Cusine, D.J., Standard Securities, 2nd ed., LexisNexis UK, 2002

Crerar, L.D., The Law of Banking in Scotland, Butterworths, 1997
Hapgood, M., Paget’s Law of Banking, 12th ed., Butterworths, 2002, para 28.9

Articles

Dickson, S.F., Good Faith in Contract, Spousal Guarantees and Smith v Bank of Scotland, S.L.T. 1998, 6, pp. 39-45

Harper Macleod Solicitors, Recent Developments in Banking Law Including Ongoing Issues Re Mumford & Smith v The Bank of Scotland, Harper Macleod Solicitors Banking Bulletin

MacGregor, L., The House of Lords “Applies” O’Brien North of the Border, E.L.R. Vol. 2, pp. 90-93

Gretton, G., Sexually Transmitted Debt, S.L.T. 1997, 25, 195-197

Higgins, M., A Break from the Old Routine: The Doctrine in Smith, SLT 2002, 21, 173-175

Harper Macleod Solicitors, Security Advice, Harper Macleod Solicitors Banking Bulletin 1

David Johnston, The Renewal of the Old [1997] CLJ 80

Harper Macleod Solicitors, Banks, Wives and Security – Taking Stock of Developments Since Smith, Harper Macleod Solicitors Banking Bulletin 7

Pope, D., Scots Law Takes Actual Notice of Barclays Bank v O’Brien, JIBL 1997, 12(12), 493-494

Legal Author

Legal Author

This post was written by a legal author invited to publish on YouBlawg for free because of the high value associated with their work. If you'd like to register your interest in publishing really high quality legal content here, please get in touch via our Contact page

Previous post:

Next post: